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Abstract: This paper examines Congressional support of the Byrd Amendment, a new 
antidumping law that directs the U.S. Customs Service to distribute collected duties to 
protected firms.  A critical feature of the Byrd Amendment is that it produces a highly 
transparent measure of how much each firm is rewarded for its rent-seeking efforts to 
secure the bill’s passage, specifically the dollar value its Byrd disbursement.  Therefore, 
this policy provides researchers with a unique setting in which to study the link between 
campaign contributions, Congressional behavior, and the subsequent financial returns to 
firms.  Our empirical results show that campaign contributions from potential 
beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the Byrd 
Amendment. We also show that political contributions from the law’s beneficiaries 
increased with the rewards that they expected to receive, although not by as much as 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
In late 2000, President Clinton signed legislation containing the most 
controversial antidumping legislation in decades. “The Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA),”  informally known as the Byrd Amendment,  required 
U.S. Customs Service to distribute all collected antidumping (AD) duties to firms that 
had supported the original petitions of existing AD orders.
1  Prior to the Byrd 
Amendment, AD law (like tariffs in general) provided only indirect support by 
forcing targeted foreign competitors to pay added taxes. Passage of the CDSOA 
meant that U.S. companies could now directly receive financial aid, with 
disbursements generating a totally new source of revenue for recipient firms.  Byrd 




The Byrd Amendment has been derided almost universally by international 
economists and US trade partners.  Even President Clinton, who signed the 
Agricultural Bill containing the Byrd Amendment, stated unequivocally: “I call on the 
Congress to override this provision, or amend it to be acceptable, before they 
adjourn.”  Despite these criticisms, the CDSOA was implemented and led to the 
distribution of almost $500 million to U.S. firms in its first two years of operation.  In 
2002, an unprecedented number of WTO-member countries joined together to contest 
the CDSOA’s legality under international trade law.
3  In 2003, a WTO appellate body 
ruled that the provision violates WTO law and must be repealed in order to avoid 
retaliatory measures.   
   
The Byrd Amendment provides a highly transparent measure of how much each 
firm was rewarded for its rent-seeking efforts to secure the bill’s passage, specifically 
the dollar value its Byrd disbursement.  Therefore, this policy provides us with a 
unique setting in which to study the link between campaign contributions, 
Congressional behavior, and the subsequent financial returns to firms.  In the 
following paper, we shed light on who originally supported the CDSOA and who has 
benefited from it.  We investigate the link between the bill’s Congressional sponsors 
                                                 
1 The CDSOA was contained in the Agriculture Spending bill passed by the 106
th Congress (Public Law 
106-387).  Prior to the CDSOA, dumping duties collected by US Customs were ultimately transferred to 
the US Treasury.  The CDSOA, which modified antidumping law dating back to the Tariff Act of 1930, 
requires that duties be placed into individual accounts of US firm that were the original petitioners of 
standing AD orders.  Such firms are then directed to petition Customs for the collected duties, in order to 
pay for “qualified” expenditures, including manufacturing facilities, equipment, research and development, 
and personnel training.   
2 An interesting issue that we investigate in a separate paper is whether US firms will be less likely to 
pursue prohibitive duty levels, since a complete removal of imports would, by definition, lead to zero Byrd 
disbursements. Theoretically, US firms should pursue dumping duties that simultaneously minimize 
imports but maximize Byrd revenues.  In this sense, the Byrd Amendment transforms the dumping margin 
proposed by US petitioners to the US Department of Commerce (DOC) into a strategic variable.   
3 11 members requested the establishment of a panel (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, EU, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Thailand), and six others joined as third parties supporting the complaints 
(Argentina,  Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, and Norway).  See 
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2003/2003003.htm.   
  2and its corporate beneficiaries, focusing on the flow of campaign contributions 
between the two groups.  Our results indicate that contributions from beneficiary 
firms increased a legislator’s probability of sponsoring the Byrd Amendment.  The 
probability of sponsorship was also higher for Republicans, members of the Senate, 
opponents of free trade, and those legislators representing states with relatively large 
steel industries.  Additionally, we find evidence that political contributions from the 
law’s beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to receive, although not 
by as much suggested by some political economy models of trade policy. 
 
Our analysis begins with an overview of some of the political economy models 
that seek to explain patterns of trade protection, as well as empirical studies that have 
tested the validity of these models.  In Section III, we present a brief legislative 
history of the Byrd Amendment, and its economic and political repercussions. Section 
IV contains our empirical model and a discussion of the data used in the analysis.  
Results of the empirical tests are presented in Section V, while Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  The Political Economy of Trade Protection 
 
Economists have developed a wide-variety of political economy approaches to 
explain the formation of trade policy.  For example, Mayer [1984] uses a median 
voter framework to postulate that the tariff schedule is developed according to the 
interests of voters and, thus, is a function of an economy’s factor-ownership 
distribution.  Because few countries utilize direct democratic voting to decide upon 
complicated issues such as trade policy, Hillman [1982] develops an alternative 
model in which the tariff rate is the solution to an optimizing problem in which the 
government faces a trade off between political support from industries and the 
dissatisfaction of consumers.  Hillman is one of the first to postulate that the welfare 
that accrues to elected officials due a specific decision, or the political support 
function, is a weighted function of the gain to industries and aggregate welfare in the 
economy. 
 
Most political economy models since Hillman [1982] have utilized a political 
support function framework; in these models, elected officials care about the gain to 
industries because industries provide officials with political contributions which are 
essential to winning elections.  However, the models differ in the motivation and 
timing behind political contributions.  For example, Magee, Brock and Young [1989] 
suggest that candidates choose their trade policy prior to an election; industries 
contribute to the candidate whose trade policy most closely meets their needs and the 
contributions help those candidates win the election.  In contrast, Grossman and 
Helpman [1994] hypothesize that special interest groups offer politicians campaign 
contributions that depend upon their policy stance.  Then politicians choose their 
stance knowing that the level of contributions depends upon their decision 
 
Several economists have tested the validity of political economy models of trade 
policy.  For example, Goldberg and Maggi [1999] directly test Grossman and 
Helpman’s [1994] “Protection for Sale” model using coverage ratios for non-tariff 
  3barriers in the United States in 1983 and find that the pattern of protection was 
consistent with the basic predictions of the model.  Baldwin and Magee [2000] 
examine Congressional voting patterns on three trade bills introduced in 1993 and 
1994 to study whether campaign contributions by Political Action Committees (PAC) 
influenced individual Congressmen’s votes.  They find that contributions from labor 
groups were associated with votes against freer trade and contributions from business 
groups were associated with votes in favor of freer trade.  Similarly, Fisher, Gokcekus 
and Tower [2002] study individual votes on the “Bipartisan Steel Recovery Act of 
1999,” and find that political contributions from the steel industry and steel unions 
increase the probability of a vote in favor of the bill, while contributions from the 
auto industry decrease the probability of an affirmative vote.      
 
Many of the same political economy models described above can also be applied 
to other policy outcomes; economists and political scientists have used a wide variety 
of methods to test if and how campaign contributions impact legislative outcomes.  
For example, Chappell [1982] compares interest group contributions and 
Congressional votes on seven different Congressional votes between 1974 and 1977; 
he is unable to conclude that contributions have a significant impact on voting 
decisions, particularly compared to personal ideology and the preferences of 
constituents.  Stratmann [1991] suggests that these results may be due to the 
complexity of the issues chosen for study; in a similar study using votes on subsidies 
to the farm sector he finds that contributions are an important determinant in 
explaining voting behavior; he also finds that relatively small amounts of 
contributions can have important consequences for the outcome of Congressional 
elections.  
 
Other empirical papers have postulated that campaign contributions and lobbying 
may influence legislative outcomes slightly differently.  Wright [1990] finds that 
while campaign contributions prove useful in explaining special interest group’s 
lobbying patterns, it is lobbying, not money, that shape Congressional member’s 
policy decisions.  Hall and Wayman [1990] conclude that campaign contributions are 
more likely to influence the degree of Congressional members’ involvement in a 
particular piece of legislation, not their vote. 
 
Although there have been no empirical studies that examine whether campaign 
contributions have influenced changes in U.S. antidumping statutes, numerous 
economists have analyzed whether political economy models of trade policy can 
explain the outcomes of antidumping petitions.  Models of bureaucratic decision-
making suggest that bureaucratic agencies such as the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) may become closely controlled by Congress.  Moore [1992], 
Hansen and Prusa [1997], and Liebman [2001] all find evidence that constituents of 
the Congressmen on the committees charged with overseeing the ITC are favored in 
the antidumping petition process.  However, like Devault [2001], many of these 
studies find that economic criteria are more important determinants of petition 
outcomes.  
 
  4Like Baldwin and Magee [2000] and similar papers, this study analyzes the 
impact of campaign contributions on legislative outcomes.  However, because we 
observe which firms applied for Byrd Amendment dollars in the year following 
passage of the legislation, we are able to pinpoint those firms whose contributions 
were most likely made to pressure Congressional members to support the 
Amendment.  The Byrd Amendment also provides a unique opportunity to study the 
marginal return per dollar of campaign contribution, because we observe exactly how 
much each firm benefited from the Byrd Amendment in the year following passage of 
the legislation.  Because of the distinct legislative history of the Byrd Amendment, 
we focus on an alternative way of measuring Congressional support for the law 
instead of using Congressional votes.  Specifically, we hypothesize that firms use 
campaign contributions to pressure Congressmen to sponsor the legislation and, thus, 
help ensure its passage.  
 
III.  History of the Byrd Amendment 
 
Despite the global controversy that has developed over the Byrd Amendment, 
Congress enacted the law with virtually no debate and little thought as to its 
consequences.  In fact, some would say its passage serves to illustrate important 
weaknesses in the U.S. legislative process. 
 
On March 2, 1999, Rep. Ralph Regula (R-OH) introduced a new bill, the 
“Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 1999” (H.R. 842) to the U.S. House 
of Representatives.  Just two weeks later, Sen. Michael DeWine (R-OH) introduced 
an identical bill (S. 61) to the Senate.  Both bills were referred to committees with 




Late the following year, Congress was working furiously to complete the 
Agriculture Appropriations bill of 2001 prior to the end of the fiscal year.
5  The bill 
was relatively uncontroversial, providing funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
and its programs such as farm subsidies, food stamps, and natural disaster assistance.  
Although the Senate passed its version of the bill on July 20 and the House soon 
followed on July 22, these bills were not referred to a conference committee until 
September 28, just days before the end of the fiscal year.
6 
 
  The 28 members of the conference committee, chaired by Rep. C. W. Bill Young 
(R-FL), met on October 3 to resolve differences between the two versions of the bill.  
                                                 
4 The House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee have jurisdiction over all 
international trade issues, thus any legislation dealing with trade policy is typically debated, amended and 
passed by these Committees before being referred to the entire House or Senate for further amendment and 
vote.  
5 Each year, Congress must pass 13 appropriations bills that provide the legal authority to spend U.S. 
Treasury funds on such things as agriculture and defense.  If these bills are not passed by October 1, or the 
start of the fiscal year, Congress must pass short-term funding bills or face a government shut-down. 
6 Following passage of a bill in both the House and Senate, the bill must then be considered by a 
Conference Committee, who is charged with resolving the differences between the two bills.  
  5Typically, conferees are limited in the changes they can make to appropriations bills.  
For example, conferees are not allowed to insert new matter that is not germane to the 
differences between the two versions of the bills.  However, one of the conferees, 
Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV) apparently proposed to amend the bill with the “Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act.”  The new language, now known as the Byrd 
Amendment, was incorporated into the agricultural appropriations bills by a vote of 7 
to 6, with 15 conferees either absent or abstaining from the vote. 
   
Supporters of the Byrd Amendment claimed that there were not enough votes to 
strike the provision from the conference report.  However, some press reports 
indicated that the Rep. Young (R-FL), the chair of the conference committee, allowed 
the amendment because he did not want to antagonize Sen. Byrd during the final days 
of the appropriation process.
7  The inappropriate amendment did not go unnoticed by 
the rest of Congress.  Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Bill 
Archer (R-TX) wrote in a letter to Young that “I must insist that the amendment be 
deleted before filing the final conference report.”  
 
Despite Archer’s protest, the amendment remained in the final conference report.  
Traditionally, conference reports are passed with minimal debate and no amendments.  
Members did have the option of raising a point of order against the conference report 
because it included non-germane provisions, but none did.  During debate on the 
conference report, only two members spoke against inclusion of the Byrd 
Amendment.  Rep. James Kolbe (R-AZ) stated that “because of my strong opposition 
to this provision, I will reluctantly vote against this bill today.”
8  Sen. Don Nickles 
(R-OK) asserted that the amendment “could not pass the Finance Committee. It could 
not pass the Ways and Means Committee. Again, how many colleagues are even 
aware that this is in the bill?   The Finance Committee, which deals with trade, would 
totally reject this idea of rewarding people if they file successful dumping lawsuits.”
9  
Both voted against the conference report.  Nevertheless, the report passed in the 
House by a margin of 340 to 75 and in the Senate by a margin of 86 to 8.  
 
Following its passage, the law was strongly criticized by U.S. importers and 
exporters, as well as its leading trading partners. For example, a group of U.S. 
importers claimed in February 2001 that the law “creates a financial incentive to 
support petitions [in order to collect] duties later, and could work to increase the 
number of ...cases filed.”
10  European Union officials stated that the system “creates a 
perverse incentive system” to reward companies for bringing complaints.
11  Empirical 
studies suggest that opponents were correct in their supposition that the Byrd 
Amendment would increase the level of antidumping protection in the United States.  
                                                 
7 “Byrd Amendment on AD, CVD Duties Prevails in Conference,” Inside U.S. Trade, October 6, 2000, pg. 
8. 
8 Congressional Record, 2000.  106th Cong., 2nd session, Vol. 146, pt. 126. 
9 Ibid. 
10 “Importer Group Urges U.S. Congress to Repeal Byrd Amendment,” Dow Jones International News, 
February 13, 2001. 
11 Elizabeth Olson, “U.S. Law on Trade Fines is Challenged Overseas,” The New York Times, July 14, 
2001 
  6Olson [2004] found strong evidence that industries have filed more antidumping 
petitions since passage of the Byrd Amendment.  
 
Although antidumping petitions have increased under Byrd Amendment, it is 
unclear what impact the new law has had on consumers and aggregate welfare.  Using 
a theoretical model of firm decision-making, Evenett [2004] finds that a provision 
like the Byrd Amendment encourages domestic firms to raise prices, thus lowering 
total welfare, as doing so increases the sales of foreign firms and increases tariff 
revenue.  Evenett’s results also suggest that foreign firms are better off under the 
Byrd Amendment because of the price increase.  In contrast, a model developed by 
Collie and Vandenbussche [2004] suggests that the Byrd Amendment can lead to 
lower antidumping duties and increase aggregate welfare; intuitively, domestic firms 
only receive Byrd funds if the government collects tariff revenue therefore firms are 
unlikely to request and pressure government officials for prohibitive tariff levels.   
 
What is clear is that the Byrd Amendment has proven to be extremely popular 
among certain U.S. firms since its passage.  Customs distributed $561.1 million to 
over 1,200 firms between 2001 and 2002.  The value of individual awards ranged 
from hundreds of dollars to more than $60 million.  Table [1] includes a list of the 
leading beneficiary industries in 2001. 
 
The World Trade Organization ruled in September 2002 that the Byrd 
Amendment violates the international agreement on subsidies and directed the United 
States to abolish the law.  There are currently two bills pending before Congress that 
would repeal the Byrd Amendment, although it is unclear when action on these bills 
will be taken. 
 
IV.  Econometric Specification and Data 
 
As noted above, most studies of the political economy of trade protection utilize 
Congressional votes on a particular piece of legislation as the dependent variable to 
test for the presence of political influence.  However, because the Byrd Amendment 
was part of a larger non-trade related bill, the votes on this particular bill cannot be 
considered indicative of the level of support for the Byrd Amendment.  For example, 
Rep. Archer, who was so adamant that the Byrd Amendment should be excluded 
from the appropriations bill, abstained from the final vote on the conference report.  
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL) still voted in favor of the bill, despite 
stating that the provision was “counter to fundamental negotiating objectives” in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).
12   
 
Therefore, we use a measure of legislative involvement as the dependent variable 
to test whether political contributions influence legislative outcomes.  Hall and 
Wayman [1990] measure this involvement as the member’s activity during formal 
committee mark-ups and committee action behind the scenes, however this data is not 
                                                 
12 “Byrd Amendment on AD, CVD Duties Prevails in Conference,” Inside U.S. Trade, October 6, 2000, pg. 
8.  
  7publicly available for the Byrd Amendment.  Therefore, we proxy legislative 
involvement with whether or not the member was a co-sponsor of the original bill 
introduced in the House and Senate.  There were 68 cosponsors of the “Continued 
Dumping or Subsidy Offset Act” in the House and an additional 26 in the Senate.  Six 
of these cosponsors were on the conference committee that attached the Byrd 
Amendment to the appropriations bill.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that 
these cosponsors were integral in the final passage of the Byrd Amendment. 
 
Political economy models of trade policy suggest that a legislator’s involvement 
will be influenced by industry campaign contributions as well as constituent 
characteristics.  We propose that campaign contributions received by the legislator are 
a function of the expected benefits firms expect to receive from the Byrd 
Amendment, the legislator’s expected policy position, and the influence the legislator 
may have on passage of the legislation.  As noted in Chappell [1982], Stratmann 
[1991], and Baldwin and Magee [2000], the residuals in the involvement equation and 
contribution equation may be correlated.  In other words, the same unobserved factors 
may influence both the level of contributions made to a Congressman and his or her 
support for the Byrd Amendment.  Therefore, we analyze the level of legislative 
involvement in the Byrd Amendment and the campaign contributions received by the 
legislator using a “simultaneous probit-Tobit” model proposed by Chappell [1982]. 
 
Specifically, define Si
* as the legislator i’s propensity to actively support or 
sponsor the Byrd Amendment, and a dummy variable Si that equals 1 when the 
legislator chooses to sponsor the legislation.  Define Ci as the value of political 
contributions from firms that expect to benefit from the Byrd Amendment following 
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  8The political economy models discussed above suggest that legislative outcomes 
will be influenced by contributions from both opponents and proponents of the 
legislation.  However, as noted above there are no clear losers from the Byrd 
Amendment; therefore, we focus solely on contributions from the proponents or 
beneficiaries of the Byrd Amendment.  We collected political contribution data from 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC).  Firm contributions are the sum of 
contributions by any Political Action Committees (PAC) affiliated with the firm as 
well as contributions by individuals who list the firm as their primary place of 
employment between 1998 and 2000.
13  
 
As noted above, the legislator’s level of involvement and, thus, the level of 
contributions, may also be influenced by constituent interests.  To control for pre-
existing Congressional attitudes toward trade policy and, possibly, the Byrd 
Amendment, we include the Congressional member’s vote on the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act of 2000.  The bill, which was one of the few trade actions taken by 
the 106
th Congress, expanded trade relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Caribbean Basin, renewed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, 
and reauthorized the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program.  It passed in the 
House by a margin of 309 to 110 and in the Senate by a margin of 77 to 19.   
 
We also include a dummy variable for legislators who represent states in which 
the steel industry accounts for at least 0.10 percent of total employment.  Because 
steel represents more than one-third of the total AD caseload, it is likely that 
legislators from these states would be pre-disposed to vote for more favorable AD 
laws.  Finally, we include two dummy variables to capture political and institutional 
differences across members.  Because the Republican Party is generally considered 
less protectionist than the Democratic Party, we hypothesize that its members would 
be less likely to sponsor a bill like the Byrd Amendment.  Similarly, Senators, who 
have a broader constituent base than Representatives, may be less vulnerable to 
narrow interest groups like those pursuing trade protection. 
 
Grossman and Helpman [1994] find that the marginal change in political 
contributions associated with a small change in policy is equal to the effect of the 
policy change on the lobby’s gross welfare.  As noted above, the Byrd Amendment 
provides a unique chance to test this hypothesis because we observe exactly how 
much each firm benefits from the policy.  We expect the level of beneficiary firms’ 
political contributions to be highly correlated with the expected level of benefits 
associated with passage of the Byrd Amendment, which we proxy with the firm’s 
actual receipts of Byrd Amendment funds in 2001. 
 
Finally, one would expect the level of political contributions to be a function of 
the amount of influence the legislator has on passage of the legislation.  We include a 
dummy variable for those members of the House Ways and Means and Senate 
                                                 
13 These years were chosen to capture contributions that led to the legislator’s election in the Fall of 1998, 
as well as those made during the 106
th Congressional session could have encouraged the representative to 
support the CDSOA. 
  9Finance Committees because the legislation was initially referred to these 
Committees, and normally the legislation should have been passed by these 
Committees prior to being considered by the rest of Congress.  We also include the 
number of terms each legislator has served in Congress because more senior members 
of Congress typically have more power. 
 
V.  Empirical Results 
 
Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) results appear in Table [2].  
Adjusted R
2 values suggest that the model fits the data reasonably well.  All probit 
coefficients in the Byrd ‘sponsorship’ equation are significant at the one percent 
level. Most importantly, campaign contributions from disbursement recipients appear 
to have influenced support for the Byrd Amendment.  Marginal effect calculations 
indicate that an extra one thousand dollars in contributions increased the likelihood 




To further investigate the significance of campaign contributions on legislative 
outcomes, we perform a simulation similar to that performed in Baldwin and Magee 
[2000].  Using coefficient estimates from the model, we estimate the probability of 
each legislator sponsoring the CDSOA.  Summing these probabilities, we find that the 
model predicts that there will by 79 sponsors of CDSOA.
15  Recalculating these 
probabilities assuming that campaign contributions are zero, we find that the number 
of sponsors of the bill drops 67 percent from the baseline model to only 39 sponsors.  
Given the small number of legislators that actually approved inclusion of the Byrd 
Amendment on the agricultural appropriations bill, this significant decline in support 
may have been enough to prevent passage of the law. 
 
Members of the Senate and the Republican Party were more likely to sponsor the 
bill, holding other factors constant.  We find these results to be somewhat 
counterintuitive, since as noted above Republicans are traditionally more inclined 
towards free trade and Senators are generally less vulnerable to protectionist interest 
groups.  As expected, legislators from steel states were more likely to sponsor the 
Byrd Amendment.  Marginal effect calculations show that legislators from states with 
relatively high steel employment were almost eight percent more likely to sponsor the 
bill.  This is not trivial, but perhaps smaller than we would have predicted given the 
intense usage of AD law by the steel industry.
16  Finally, lawmakers generally 
                                                 
14 The estimated coefficients from a probit model cannot be interpreted as the predicted change in the 
dependent variable produced by a marginal change in the independent variable (∂y/∂x).  In order to 
measure the predicted change in the probability of an affirmative commissioner vote produced by a 
marginal change in the continuous independent variables or a discrete change in the independent dummy 
variables, marginal effects are estimated from the full model.  Marginal effects are calculated at the 
selected variable’s sample mean, evaluating all other variables at their sample means.    
15 The model appears to predict decisions in the Senate more accurately than in the House.  The model 
correctly predicts 26 sponsors in the Senate, but underestimates the number of sponsors in the House by 16. 
16 This may be related to the fact that steel producers have not been amongst the top recipients of Byrd 
disbursements. 
  10opposed to free trade, as indicated by a vote against the African Trade bill, clearly 
favored the highly protectionist Byrd Amendment. 
 
 The second equation in our system analyzes campaign contributions from firms 
that received Byrd funds.  Most explanatory variables produce significant coefficient 
estimates at either the one or five percent level.  Results indicate a positive and 
significant association between campaign contributions given by Byrd beneficiaries 
between 1998 and 2000 and the disbursements paid in 2001.  Specifically, a one 
million dollar increase in the benefits earned by those Byrd beneficiaries contributing 
to a specific legislator resulted in an average increase in political contributions of 
$194.   
 
It is difficult to interpret these results, which are aggregated at the firm level but 
disaggregated by legislator.  However, a separate analysis of disaggregated firm 
contribution data confirms the above results.  Specifically, regression results 
presented in Table [3] indicate that a million dollar increase in the Byrd 
disbursements received by individual firms resulted in an average $600 increase in 
total campaign contributions.  The larger the Byrd payout the firm expected to receive 
(in the event that the CDSOA became law), the more they donated to Congress – 
presumably to increase the likelihood of the bill’s passage.   
 
However, this result is far from supporting Grossman and Helpman’s [1994] 
prediction that the marginal change in political contributions should be equal to the 
effect of the policy change on the firm’s gross welfare.  The tiny magnitude of the 
coefficient shows that large increases in predicted disbursements are associated with 
relatively small increases in contributions.  This is possibly due to the fact that 
contributions serve to generate Congressional support for a number of issues, not just 
the CDSOA.  In fact, regression results confirm that historical levels of campaign 
contributions, prior to the introduction of the CDSOA, are a stronger predictor of 
contributions between 1998 and 2000.
17  It may also be due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the impact of the law; for example, the steel industry might have 
expected to be the largest beneficiary of the CDSOA, but it has received a relatively 
small percentage of total Byrd disbursements. 
 
We find that members of the Senate were more likely to receive larger 
contributions, a plausible outcome since a single Senate vote carries greater weight 
than a single House vote.  On the other hand, more senior senators received smaller 
contributions from Byrd recipients. We attribute this to the fact that Senators with 
longer tenures are perhaps more secure amongst their constituencies and therefore 
less likely to be influenced by contributions.  Thus, they were less likely to be 
targeted by potential Byrd beneficiaries.  Republicans also received smaller 
contributions from Byrd recipients, an expected result given the Party’s generally free 
trade orientation.  
 
                                                 
17 We define historical contributions as those made by the firms between 1995 and 1997. 
  11Finally, coefficients on the ‘African Trade Bill’ and ‘Steel State’ dummy 
variables indicate that larger contributions were given to lawmakers generally 
opposed to free trade and/or from states with larger steel industries.  Both of these 
finding are expected. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
The Byrd Amendment provides economists with a new opportunity to investigate 
the relationship between financial rewards, campaign contributions, and legislator 
behavior.  Like other empirical political economy articles, we find that campaign 
contributions strongly influenced Congressional decision making.  The nature of the 
Byrd Amendment, however, also allows us to more accurately assess the relationship 
between firm-level rewards from protectionist trade policies and firm-level campaign 
contributions.  Our results indicate that larger contributions did indeed come from 
firms that were more likely to receive large Byrd pay-outs.  However, large increases 
in Byrd disbursements are associated with only small increases in campaign 
contributions, which is far from the one-to-one correspondence predicted by some 
theoretical models.  We attribute this to two facts: contributions serve to generate 
Congressional support on several fronts, not just a single piece of legislation such as 
the CDSOA, and uncertainty surrounding the benefits of the CDSOA may have 
retarded political contributions. 
 
WTO condemnation of the Byrd Amendment has led to increasing pressure to 
remove this policy.  In the event that retaliatory measures are taken by U.S. trade 
partners, the political influence of Byrd beneficiaries will be more severely tested.  At 
that point, an opposition to the CDSOA will emerge and a more complex welfare 
analysis of this legislation will be necessary.  Until that time, U.S. firms will continue 
to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in Byrd disbursements in addition to the 
more favorable competitive conditions they enjoy due to traditional antidumping 
protection.  
  12 
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  14Table 1 
Byrd Amendment Receipts, 2001 
Product  Millions of Dollars  Share of Total 
Ball bearings  $74.6 36.1
Pasta 20.0 9.7
Petroleum wax candles  18.3 8.8
Cylindrical roller bearings  12.6 6.1
Industrial belts  8.4 4.1
Stainless steel sheet and strip  7.6 3.7
Carbon-steel flat products  7.1 3.4
Tapered roller bearings  5.2 2.5
DRAMS 5.1 2.5
Stainless-steel cookware  3.8 1.8
Other 44.1 21.3
Total $206.8 100.0
Source: U.S. Customs, “Fiscal Year Reports For Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, FY 2001.” 
  15Table 2 










Constant -1.6524**   
Contributions (in thousands of dollars)  0.0595**  0.0043  $6.64
Senate 0.8417**  0.0738  0.19
Republican 0.4093**  0.0389  0.51
African Trade Bill Vote  -1.0313**  -0.0606  0.80
Steel State  0.9504**  0.0796  0.30
   
Adjusted R
2  15.96   
   
CONTRIBUTIONS   
   
Constant 7.4389**  7.4389 
Disbursements (in thousands of dollars) 0.0002**  0.0002  $11,954.90
Senate  2.9252*    2.9252  0.19
Terms  -0.0215      -0.0215  4.61
Terms*Senate -2.0833**  -2.0833  0.47
Republican -3.6681**  -3.6681  0.51
African Trade Bill Vote  -1.5850*  -1.5850  0.80
Trade Subcommittee  -1.3572    -1.3572  0.11
Steel State  2.2570**  2.2570  0.30
  
Adjusted R
2  22.75  
  
Log Likelihood  -2005.56   
Number of Observations          535   
  
**,* indicates significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively 
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Table 3 
Firm-Level Total Political Contributions (OLS Estimation) 
Parameter Coefficient  Variable  Mean 
Constant -2.6186   
Byrd disbursements (thousands of dollars)  0.0006**  $1,605.64 
Historical contributions (thousands of dollars)  1.4856**  16.42 
Steel 4.0759  0.55 
    
Adjusted R
2  98.23  
Number of observations  142   
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 